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ABSTRACT 
Eric H. Thomas: El producto más democrático que hay: Chilean Frontier Constellations 
after Pinochet 
(Under the direction of Rudi Colloredo-Mansfeld) 
 
In its efforts to consolidate the southern frontier, the Chilean government has 
repeatedly introduced technologies of governance that target both territory and population in 
the remote Aysén region.  Through processes of territorialization, securitization, and 
bureaucratization, these technologies proscribe and prescribe practices within certain 
territories.  More recently, transnational environmental activists and organizations have 
successfully challenged development initiatives in the region.  In this context, local actors 
find themselves doubly alienated—from a state that privileges economic growth over social 
investment and from activists who privilege environmental preservation over local needs.  
Locals have responded by circumventing state technologies through novel economic 
formations and by returning to traditional practices discouraged by the modernizing state. 
This is evident in local responses to a regional firewood subsidy introduced in 2012.  From 
establishing firewood “cooperatives” to living in mutigenerational households, actors 
demonstrate that local networks and local knowledge can be deployed to challenge state 
technologies of governance. 
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The state effect, with its rearrangements of space and recalibrations of time, was worked 
out through local relationships and practices held in place by local understandings. 
(Hershatter 2011:15) 
 
With varying degrees of success, and in some cases with disastrous failure, the 
postcolonial states deployed the latest government technologies to promote the well being 
of their populations.  (Chatterjee 2004:37) 
 
It was… chaos. (Claudia Poveda Caceres, Regional Director of FOSIS, 2015) 
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DELIVERY DAY 
June 20, 2015 
Puerto Aysén is a place of apparent contradictions.  Brightly colored shingle and 
clapboard houses built in the same Chilote style for generations have been outfitted with 
satellite dishes emblazoned with the logos of Movistar and Entel.  Smoke hangs over the 
city, lingering above the chimneys of hundreds of houses, while late model Toyota trucks 
drive along the town’s muddy streets. The city is divided by a river into the ribera norte, 
the oldest part of town, occupied since the first settlers decided to stay in the early 20th 
Century, and the ribera sur, where rows of new, identical affordable housing units sit in 
front of a massive athletic complex and an even more massive construction site where the 
new hospital will soon be completed—a testament to state investments on the frontier 
My friend Jorge is a veterinarian for the state agency SernaPesca, who moved to 
the Aysén region from outside of Talca, a mere two hours from Santiago, in 2008.  He 
lives in an unassuming cabaña on the ribera norte, where today he and I will be hosting 
an asado to coincide with the Copa America matches that will be televised this afternoon.   
Jorge’s friend Alex is outside tending the grill while Jorge and I take in the first 
match of the day on Jorge’s massive flat-screen TV.  Alex is also a veterinarian, although 
he works for Marine Farm, a private salmon farming company established during the 
final years of the Pinochet regime in 1989.  He keeps yelling for updates on what he’s 
missing, and Jorge obliges him through the cracked window.  Soon, Alejandra and 
Paula, pololas (girlfriends) of Jorge and Alex, respectively, join us. 
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The relative tranquility of the gathering, which—aside from the drizzle slowly 
soaking Alex—could have taken place anywhere in Chile, is interrupted when Jorge’s 
cell phone rings.  He jumps up—Jorge is easily excitable—and heads outside into the 
rain.  I run after him, grabbing my raincoat and calling out, “Que pasó?” (“What 
happened?”) 
“Es la leña!” He calls back. “Ayudame, weones!” (“It’s the firewood! Help me, 
assholes!”) 
The firewood has arrived!  We were running low, and Jorge had called to 
arrange a delivery that morning.  Now, upon opening the gate that separates the string of 
cabañas from the street, we can see a middle aged man and a woman, he in a blue jacket 
and black beret, she in a brightly patterned sweater and windbreaker pants.  They are 
standing in the back of their camioneta (light truck), covered by a tarpaulin stretched 
loosely over a metal frame.  They are heaving firewood into the soft earth between the 
street and sidewalk.  They greet Jorge, and he shakes both their hands, asking for the 
woman’s name, as she’s the one he spoke to when he called.  Her name is Elisa, and she 
takes his money—30,000 pesos, about $47 USD—before resuming her heaving.  Both she 
and her husband, the man in the beret, are cheery, and make small talk with Jorge as 
they continue to unload the truck.  While they are still working, Jorge pulls a 
wheelbarrow around from the side of the cabaña and begins to load it.  I help.  Alex is 
nowhere to be found. 
We bring the cubic meter of pre-cut firewood inside the gate, and dump it in the 
alley between Jorge’s cabaña and his neighbor’s.  It takes several trips, and Alex and the 
girls look on in amusement.  When Jorge mocks Alex for being too flojo (lazy) to help, 
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Alex defends himself by saying he’s busy with the meat.  Alejandra offers that she would 
help, but is still tired from having firewood delivered to her house the previous afternoon.  
Paula says nothing, but watches us as we proceed back and forth with the wheelbarrow 
until the alley is nearly full.  Inside, the woodstove is burning away, the only heat source 
in the four-room cabaña.  Outside, the meat sizzles on the grill, the girls huddle under the 
roofline, and the rain continues to fall. 
The Politics of Firewood  
 
Firewood deliveries like this one are a daily occurrence during the winter in the 
Aysén region, where passes leading east through the Andes to Argentina and west to the 
sea have facilitated travel and trade for generations.  The need for firewood—and the 
practices associated with its procurement and use—are part of what sets Aysén apart 
from the rest of the country.   
Residents, whether they were raised in the region or came from other parts of 
Chile in order to work in one of its rapidly expanding industries, must develop and 
mobilize firewood knowledge, learning what it takes to keep a fire burning through the 
long Patagonian winter.  In one sense, what it takes is simple, even mundane: a clear 
chimney, a watchful eye to guard against stray coals, and a steady supply of hardwood—
not the soft pine grown on timber plantations—or, for those able to buy a winter’s supply 
in advance, a place to store a surplus.  But frontiers are unstable places subject to state 
interventions and labor flows that challenge even the most mundane practices: timber 
plantations have replaced native hardwood with Douglas fir; subsidies designed to help 
“vulnerable” families have caused massive price increases; environmental groups, mostly 
from outside the region, have pushed for conservation measures that limit local access to 
public land.   
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Firewood is therefore not only inextricably linked to the region’s past, but also to 
its present and future.  Following protests by angry Ayséninos1 fed up with the Chilean 
government’s lack of social investment on the southern frontier and the high cost of 
living in the region (Zibechi 2012), the state agency Fondo de Solidaridad e Inversión 
Social (Fund for Solidarity and Social Investment; FOSIS) introduced a bono de 
calefacción (heating bonus) for certain qualified residents starting in 2012.  This latest 
“technology of governance” (Foucault 2006:140; Rose 2006:147) targeting the wellbeing 
of frontier citizens was intended to return the region to its former, depoliticized state.  
Technologies like the subsidy are often introduced in response to local protests and 
problems, and for the government in Santiago, the protests in February 2011, which 
paralyzed much of the remote region, were indeed a serious problem.   
In 2012, however, the bureaucrats at FOSIS had no experience with firewood 
procurement or delivery, particularly on such a scale.  Ayséninos on the other hand—
whose forbearers were Patagones who came over the mountains from Argentina and 
Chilotes who traveled down the fjords from the island of Chiloé—have been in the 
firewood business since before the formal establishment of the region in 1928.   
As a result, the “chaos” that accompanied the introduction of this latest state 
technology actually provided an opportunity for some residents living on the frontier to 
redirect state efforts and exploit the dramatic price increases that accompanied state 
intervention, even as other residents suffered.  Because of the importance of firewood, 
everyone in the region was affected by the introduction of the subsidy, and this has had a 
profound impact on both how citizens view the state and where they interact with it. 
Citizens’ responses to the firewood subsidy, which has been modified and expanded in 
                                                 
1 As residents of the region are known. 
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the years since 2012, have revealed that local knowledge and local networks represent 
powerful tools for redirecting state technologies and resources.   
In Coyhaique, the region’s capital and largest city, the government offices that 
line the streets around the pentagonal Plaza de Armas testify to the Chilean state’s role on 
the frontier, as it has sought to incorporate the region into the national economy via 
processes of territorialization, securitization, and bureaucratization.  In the Chilean south, 
though these processes have been at work since the founding of Aysén, they accelerated 
rapidly under the military dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet (1973-1990).  During the 
dictadura, as it is known, state agents mapped vast tracts of land and proscribed and 
prescribed the activities that could take place within them, inaugurated massive 
infrastructure projects to connect far-flung parts of the region, garrisoned soldiers and 
police in frontier towns, and sent technocratic experts to the area to oversee its 
development.  The economic boom in the timber and farmed salmon sectors that 
characterized much of the 1990s seemed to validate Pinochet’s vision, and to demonstrate 
that the frontier had been settled once and for all. 
Yet contrary to conventional wisdom, which argues that processes such as those 
described above ultimately lead to the stabilization and depoliticization of frontiers, 
Ayséninos have used their local knowledge—itself a product of the region’s historical 
remoteness and isolation from the rest of Chile—to redirect and circumvent state 
technologies targeting both territory and population.  In so doing they have shown how 
local actors can destabilize frontier spaces and gain greater autonomy without directly 
challenging state authority. 
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Nikolas Rose has written, “the ‘power of the state’ is a resultant, not a cause, an 
outcome of the composition and assembling of actors, flows, buildings, relations of 
authority into relatively durable associations mobilized… towards the achievement of 
particular objectives by common means.”  (Rose 2006:148)  However durable the 
associations within the assemblage of state power appeared prior to 2011, the protests and 
the state’s subsequent efforts to stabilize the region show that the power of the state is 
still being contested and negotiated by a range of actors.  Technologies introduced to 
placate angry residents as well as the ways in which they have been implemented have 
provided opportunities for Ayséninos to redirect state strategies, even as these strategies 
have expanded state influence to new sites where it was once absent.  Efforts by the state 
to subsidize and regulate the firewood industry—an industry unique to the region and 
built around its citizens’ self-sufficiency, ingenuity, and hard work—have shown that the 
frontier remains unsettled.  The state subsidy has made Aysénino fireplaces into a site 
where citizens can challenge initiatives they consider misguided or even dangerous.   
An Unassuming Monument 
June 24, 2015 
 The walk to Los Palos, just north of Puerto Aysén is a muddy one in the winter.  It 
rarely snows in Puerto Aysén—unlike in Coyhaique and other settlements further 
inland—because the town sits at sea level.  Instead, from April to August, there is a 
virtually constant drizzle that permeates the air and gives everything a damp quality that 
is only escapable in the presence of a woodstove.  The first time I walked to Los Palos, it 
was in this drizzle, the sky was overcast, and the tops of the mountains that surround 
Puerto Aysén were barely visible through the mist.  In short, it was a day like any other. 
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 Los Palos today is a collection of houses that extend beyond a single fork in the 
gravel road.  The houses are spread out, with fields around them where cattle and sheep 
lazily graze at the base of steep slopes.  There are waterfalls everywhere, as runoff from 
the constant precipitation seeks the fastest route to the valley floor and then to the fjord 
beyond.  It is the middle of the afternoon, and no one is visible in the fields around the 
houses of Los Palos.  Only a fool—or an errant anthropologist—would be out in the 
damp cold unless there was a truly compelling reason.  There is almost no traffic on the 
road, except for a Land Rover decorated with bumper stickers reading “No a 
hidroaysén!” and a passenger door emblazoned with the logo for a local eco-lodge well 
outside of Puerto Aysén.  The driver speeds by me, but then hesitates.  As I continue 
walking, he rolls down the passenger window and gestures down the road, offering me a 
lift to wherever it is I’m going.  I wave him off and he looks over at his passenger, a man 
with a weathered face and a tangle of gray hair.  The two of them smile at me, but shake 
their heads at each other as if to say, “crazy gringo.” 
 At the fork in the road, the nearest thing to a “center” of Los Palos, there is a 
monument, built in stages from 2010 to 2012.  It is made of wood, but is sheltered by an 
aluminum roof.  The monument includes a sign describing how in the 1920s, families in 
the employ of the Compania Industrial de Aysén were given 40 hectares each for their 
work, and an additional 40 hectares for every male child over the age of twelve: “A 
medida que iban llegando, se iba poblando, así los terrenos vírgenes se fueron haciendo 
campos explotables…” (As they arrived, [the region] was populated, and in this way 
virgin lands were made into exploitable fields). 
 8 
 Even more striking than this romantic language of the frontier, however, is the 
sculpture at the center of the monument.  It depicts a mustachioed man in a hooded wool 
coat standing in the center of a rowboat full of firewood, his gaze fixed and his hands on 
the oars, which dip into the gravel beneath the boat.  The figure is carved from a single 
tree, but the boat is made from individual planks, just as many of the wooden boats in use 
on the river are today.  The monument, however, is unfinished wood covered with a coat 
of varnish, rather than the garish colors one finds on contemporary launches and fishing 
vessels.  This lends it a certain austere quality.  Beneath the hooded man and his boat, a 
sign reads: 
 
En honor a los que llegaron primero. 
Los primeros pobladores de la comunidad fueron colonos que llegaban 
principalmente de la isla de Chiloe.  La actividad económica que 
realizaban era la venta de leña donde participaba toda la familia y así 
limpiaban sus campos para hacer empastadas y criar ganado.  Cuando el 
camino era el río la leña se transportaba en botes, hacia la naciente ciudad 
de Puerto Aysén, donde la vendían a sus habitantes y los barcos de la 
época que la utilizaban como combustible para producir vapor.  Con estos 
ingresos compraban los víveres necesarios y volvían a sus campos 
aprovechando la diferencias de mareas, tanto para bajar el río como para 
remontarlo a su regreso. 
 
In honor of those who arrived first. 
The first inhabitants of the community were colonists who arrived 
principally from the island of Chiloe.  The economic activity in which they 
participated was the selling of firewood, [an activity] in which the whole 
family participated and in this way cleared their fields to make pastures 
and raise cattle.  When the road was the river, the wood was transported 
in boats to the nascent city of Puerto Aysén, where it was sold to the 
inhabitants and to the ships of the era, which used it as fuel to produce 
steam.  With their earnings [the colonists] bought necessary provisions 
and returned to their fields taking advantage of the tidal differences to 
come down the river and to re-ascend it on their return. 
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Frontier Mythologies 
Frontiers like Aysén have long been spaces constructed in the popular imaginary 
as sites where a few “rugged individuals” settle seeking new land and untapped resources 
that they can exploit.  In the United States, this image comes from stories and textbooks, 
but also from black and white photographs of families homesteading on the Great Plains 
and men panning for gold in California rivers.  According to the mythology of the 
frontier, these are spaces of conflict between culture and nature, where individuals battle 
the elements in isolation.  But this kind of isolation and self-determination has always 
been a fiction. The Homestead Act, which allowed families to claim land they settled and 
cultivated across the American west, was a U.S. Government policy that allowed for 
public lands to pass into private hands through a very strict set of rules and regulations.2  
The gold miners who “rushed” to California in 1849 made eastern manufacturers and 
shipping magnates rich as they bought equipment and paid for passage on the ships that 
would carry them to the Pacific—ships that would often stop in Valparaiso, Chile en 
route in order to re-provision and refit.  That frontiers are national, rather than 
transnational spaces is also a fiction.  In the United States, California miners, many of 
whom were recent immigrants from Europe, were quickly joined by immigrants from 
China3, and some who didn’t strike it rich in California moved on to even more remote 
corners of the world where gold and other precious minerals were being discovered, from 
the Yukon to Australia. 
                                                 
2 Among other things, the Homestead Act of 1862 stipulated that settlers had to continuously occupy the 
land they sought to claim for five years, and limited the amount of land available to any one claimant or 
family to 160 acres. 
 
3 And even a contingent from Chile.  See Johnson 2001. 
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Aysén, of course, carries its own frontier mythology—one interlocutor who was 
born and raised in the region described her grandfather as arriving “con su hacha de 
mano” (“with his hatchet in hand”) to carve out a parcel of land for her family.  
Patagonia, which today refers to a region that covers more than a million square 
kilometers of Chile and Argentina, was for much of its history, a land separate from 
either of the two countries that now govern and seek to profit from its resources.  As late 
as the 1880s, mapmakers demarcated Patagonia as neither part of the Argentine 
Federation nor of Chile but rather its own bounded territory, stretching from the Atlantic 
to the Pacific.  Indeed, the majority of ships that charted the southern shores and islands 
of the region were captained by Englishmen.  Today, some residents even maintain that 
the name “Aysén” is actually derived from the English expression “Ice Ends,” 
supposedly written on the maps of British mariners at the spot where the glaciers of 
Southern Patagonia give way to the forests and rivers of the North.   
It was not until 1870 that the Chilean navy sent Admiral Enrique Simpson4 to 
conduct a hydrographic survey of the southern archipelagoes and chart Patagonia’s rivers, 
inlets and fjords.  This he did in two expeditions from 1870-1871 and again in 1874, 
naming the deep-water port, Puerto Chacabuco, for his ship in the process (Simpson 
2011).  At the time of his voyage, Chile had been an independent republic for over fifty 
years, and charting the region’s coastline was seen as critical to establishing the western 
side of the Andes as a part of the country. 
For residents who settled there, however, Patagonia remained something apart, 
separated not only by distance from the rest of Chile, but also by custom, climate, and 
                                                 
4 Simpson, like the Chilean independence hero Bernardo O’Higgins had ancestors from the British Isles, as 
did several other prominent members of the Chilean navy during this period. Today one of the Aysén 
region’s more prominent rivers is Rio Simpson, named for the admiral. 
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imagination.  Historian Thomas Miller Klubock has described the conditions on Chile’s 
southern frontier, and the difficulties the Chilean state faced in its efforts to govern the 
south during the early 20th century:  
[T]he state had only the most tenuous administrative and coercive control 
over its southern frontier, comprising fully a third of Chile’s national 
territory, and its capacity to exercise hegemony by building a sense of 
identification with an imagined national community rooted in a shared 
ethnicity, or with the nation state, was even more limited. The Chilean 
state’s ability to construct hegemonic rule was undermined by the rural 
population’s transience, including frequent migrations to Argentina, and 
its weak administrative presence. (Klubock 2011:123) 
 
All of this contributed to Patagonia’s de facto autonomy even as it slowly became 
a territory within Chile.  Today, the history of the region as a space apart factors into the 
way that residents’ born and raised in Aysén understand their identities—and also into 
how they are understood by outsiders.  One interlocutor, who had moved to the region as 
a young man, tried to explain what it meant to be from Aysén.  Ayséninos, he said, are 
fiercely independent, but they come together to face problems or to fight outside 
interference because of their history as colonizers and their geographic isolation.  
Generations of Ayséninos had to be independent to survive in the south, he said, but they 
also had to cooperate with one another in times of need. 
Today, the library in Puerto Aysén is decorated with black and white photographs 
depicting the early years of settlement and these are strikingly similar to images of North 
American homesteaders.  Indeed, Chileans talk about “the south” in much the same way 
North Americans talk about “the west” and even the way they often talk about Patagonia, 
as el extremo sur (the extreme south) conveys a sense of awe, danger, and distance.  But 
here too there have always been international connections and ties to the less 
romanticized industrial centers in Santiago and Valparaiso.  Steamships carrying 
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European goods made regular passage to Puerto Chacabuco, the region’s largest deep-
water port, powering their boilers by burning coal on their way south and wood—
harvested from Aysén’s native hardwood forests—on the return trip north.  After the 
military defeat of the indigenous Mapuche in the 1880s, the government in Santiago 
began resettling farmers from Chile’s central valley as well as newly arrived German 
immigrants in the south in order to populate the territory with families and to provide a 
buffer against further Mapuche uprisings in the territory south of the Bio Bio River.  The 
state provided land grants to both individual families and companies provided that they 
clear the land for agriculture. (Klubock 2004:339)  
Early state efforts to populate the frontier, however, stopped at land grants.  The 
isolation of Aysén and its geographic distance from Santiago meant that residents needed 
to be self-reliant and that they had to do “a little of everything.”  Several Ayséninos with 
whom I spoke described the varied daily tasks and skills they had learned from their 
parents and grandparents.  That the region was successfully populated was more a tribute 
to the diversity of work undertaken by the earliest arrivals than the Chilean state—
something not lost on residents today.  Still, the region was successfully populated and 
soon, grain grown by these new arrivals in the south of Chile would feed other settlers as 
far away Australia. (Mayo 1990) 
The Dictator’s Vision 
Frontiers, thus, should be understood as highly dynamic nodes in transnational 
networks, subject to state policies and commercial exploitation as well as the will of the 
“rugged individuals” inhabiting them. Writing on the global connections to be found at 
resource rich frontiers today, Anna Tsing has described frontiers as “spaces of desire” 
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where governments and corporations promote the idea of “virgin” wilderness, unlimited 
resources, and boundless employment opportunities for migrants combine to lead to 
expansion and large-scale extractivism (Tsing 2003; 2004).  Echoing this idea, Danilo 
Geiger has written, “frontiers recede and advance in relation to changing demands for 
frontier commodities on regional and world markets.” (Geiger 2008:93) in a process 
Keith Barney has termed “frontier neoliberalism” (Barney 2009:146).  According to 
Michael Eilenberg, “frontier processes should be seen as cyclical phenomena that wax 
and wane according to the strength of the state and the pressure of global markets.” 
(Eilenberg 2014:162)  Though much of this contemporary scholarship on frontiers 
focuses on Southeast Asia, the phenomena and language of frontiers is equally applicable 
in southern Chile. 
According to conventional wisdom, “frontier” discourses are mobilized by the 
state for the purposes of resource extraction—dependent on pressures from the global 
marketplace—and territorial expansion.  The expansion of the “civilizing state” and the 
correlated “exclusion of locals by settlers and state planners” (Eilenberg 2014:162) 
should therefore be temporary processes; the frontier cannot remain a frontier indefinitely 
and will ultimately be incorporated, both symbolically and economically, into the rest of 
the nation.  
The military junta that deposed democratically elected Marxist president Salvador 
Allende on September 11, 1973 saw the incorporation of Chile into the global economy 
as essential to “saving” the country (Stern 2006). The head of the junta, Augusto Ugarte 
Pinochet and his economic team, known as the “Chicago Boys”5 saw the export of 
                                                 
5 They had studied under Milton Freidman at the University of Chicago as part of an exchange program 
with Universidad Católica de Chile. 
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Chile’s natural resources—nearly all of which are located in the country’s far north or 
south— as an engine for free market reforms.  Control and integration of the nation’s 
frontiers was now imperative, and Pinochet had a distinct vision for the south of Chile. 
Pinochet is an infamous figure.  He oversaw the execution or disappearance of 
over 3,000 Chilean citizens (Rettig Commission Report 1991) and the detainment and 
torture of more than 38,0006 (The National Commission on Political Imprisonment and 
Torture Report 2004).  His secret police, known as the DINA (Dirección de Inteligencia 
Nacional)7 carried out killings as far away as Buenos Aires and Washington DC.  It is 
important to recall, however, especially during the early years of the military regime, he 
enjoyed widespread—if not majority—support among Chileans who had disapproved of 
the political and economic volatility that characterized the Allende years, largely due to 
interference by the US State Department.8 (Stern 2006)  This enabled him, along with the 
leaders of the Chilean Navy, Air Force, and carabineros to take sweeping actions for the 
sake of “national security” and the rapid improvement of the battered economy. 
Territorialization 
Defined by political geographer Robert Sack as “the attempt by an individual or 
group to affect, influence, or control people, phenomena, and relationships by delimiting 
and asserting control over a geographic area,” (Sack 1986:19) territorialization under 
                                                 
6 Both of these figures are probably extremely low estimates, due to the fact that official investigations into 
human rights violations under Pinochet are still highly contested and the result of compromises between 
center-left and center-right parties, the latter of which have consistently favored reconciliation over truth 
and justice.  For an excellent discussion of the political struggles over repression, torture, and 
disappearances during and immediately after the dictatorship see Steve Stern’s Memory Box trilogy. 
 
7 And later renamed the CNI (Central Nacional de Informaciones) after international pressure forced him to 
take a more clandestine approach to torture and murder. 
 
8 It has become clear in the years since 1973—but particularly since the recent declassification of internal 
State Department memos—that the CIA, with the explicit backing of President Richard Nixon and 
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, had imposed an “invisible blockade” designed to “make the economy 
scream” in order to undermine Allende’s government (Garcia Marquez 1974; Winn 2004) 
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Pinochet first entailed literally redrawing the map of Chile.  Pinochet was not content 
with the organization of the country as it was.  What had previously been 25 provinces 
became 13 regions, each identified with a number, from I (Tarapacá on the Peruvian 
border) to XII (Magallanes y Antarctica Chilena).9  Under this new system, Aysén—
which had operated as a province since its formal establishment in 1928—was designated 
Región XI.  
But the territorialization of the Chilean south meant more than simply changing 
the names on official maps.  Territorialization represented an assemblage of contingent 
biopolitical technologies mobilized to increase the social and economic development of 
the Aysén region under conditions favorable for securing Chilean government objectives.  
For states, “territorialization is about excluding or including people within particular 
geographic boundaries, and about controlling what people do and their access to natural 
resources within those boundaries (Vandergeest and Peluso 1995:388) For Pinochet and 
the military regime, this meant establishing natural reserves, national parks, and a zona 
franca (free trade zone) at Puerto Chacabuco as well as expanding the bureaucratic 
offices and agencies tasked with regulating them.  
Today, the zona franca enables duty-free imports to the region, supplying the 
workforce with cheaper cars, fuel, and consumer goods—provided these are used 
primarily within the region.  When it was established it coincided with the military 
regime’s policy of apertura—the dismantling of tariff and nontariff trade barriers.  The 
apertura ended the protection of the domestic economic sector (Schurman 2004:302), 
thereby introducing cheap imports and effectively directing workers who had produced 
                                                 
9 Only the Región Metropolitana—essentially greater metropolitan Santiago—doesn’t have a number.  It is 
typically represented with the initials “RM” on numbered maps. 
 16 
goods for the local economy into rapidly expanding export-oriented sectors.  Seafood 
factories and timber plantations boomed.  Other economic sectors collapsed. 
Aihwa Ong has written about how the zoning technologies of territorialization 
represent “specific state strategies that are designed to respond effectively to the 
challenges of global markets” (Ong 2006:98) a process that is evident in the designation 
of certain kinds of spaces, the payment of higher salaries to certain state employees for 
work in these designated spaces,10 and the regulation of the economic activities allowed 
in those spaces in Aysén.  These zoning technologies offer new opportunities for workers 
willing to relocate to the far south—particularly for those with technical expertise 
deemed valuable in the timber and aquaculture industries—but they also create 
conditions of exploitation, both of workers and of the natural environment, as they 
produce commodities for the global marketplace.  
Securitization  
In order to further develop an export-oriented resource economy in the extreme 
south on its terms, the military regime needed to increase state presence and consolidate 
power.   Fabricated threats of “Marxist guerrillas” intent on civil war provided a pretense 
for the movement of more troops to the “restless” south.  Though the need for a military 
presence has long been based on the proximity to and porous nature of the border with 
Argentina—both Puerto Aysén and Coyhaique remain full of fresh-faced young men in 
camouflage due to their significant military bases—discourses of security and “law and 
                                                 
10 This is known as the zona system, however it does not apply to all government employees, and there has 
been a mobilization to extend zona benefits to state employees not currently receiving them such as 
employees working for the ministry of education.  Signs can be found across the Aysén region that read: 
Nivelación de zona, ahora! (Level the zone, now!) 
 17 
order” were also directed at supposed “domestic threats” by the Pinochet regime during 
the 1970s and 1980s.  As historian Steve Stern has written: 
The Chilean South, from Concepción through Temuco and down through 
the inland territory east and south of Valdivia constituted a symbolic 
landscape of threat—a territory that harbored MIR [Movimiento de 
Izquierda Revolucionaria, Revolutionary Leftist Movement] organizers, 
guerilla training camps, and hidden arms caches, in other words leftists 
ready to wage battle with Chilean police and troops… The narrative 
reminded Chileans that although the regime had achieved normalization 
and institutionalization, a latent threat always remained present.  It 
required a vigilant state—and justified periods of legal exception. (Stern 
2006:288) 
 
What worked in Temuco and Valdivia soon arrived in Aysén.  Securitization, an 
essential step in the development of frontier zones, required soldiers and extrajudicial 
justice, but it also established new bureaucratic processes.  The need for security forces in 
the extreme south and far north, where vast tracts of empty desert abut the Peruvian and 
Bolivian borders and where the majority of detention camps for political prisoners 
operated during the Pinochet years, eventually grew into Chile’s contemporary zona 
system.  This system provides higher salaries for certain state employees— originally 
carabineros and other military personnel but subsequently opened up to include other 
state agencies and even some private enterprises affiliated with state business—who were 
working in far-flung parts of the country.  Maintaining law and order on the frontier, 
where reinforcements might take days or even weeks to arrive, required loyal soldiers.  
Reliable payment of government salaries would help ensure that loyalty. 
Bureaucratization  
As has been well documented elsewhere, during this period, free market 
principles became the basis of so-called “political liberty” and technocratic experts—with 
the backing of Pinochet’s “National Security Doctrine”—were tasked with making this 
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ideology a reality (Valdez 1995:31).  These men implemented their market-oriented 
policies and initiatives, and oversaw the expansion of industries deemed to be in the 
national interest.  This required a military presence in the far south, but more importantly 
it required bureaucrats and government offices from which experts could direct this kind 
of economic development.  
While Pinochet and his secret police purged most of the academic departments at 
the Universidad de Chile and Universidad Católica—Chile’s most prestigious 
universities—in order to eliminate suspected leftists and Allende sympathizers, forestry 
departments were left largely intact.  Soon after, a combination of tax incentives and state 
union busting allowed the timber industry in Aysén to market its products to international 
buyers (Winn 2004:19-22; Klubock 2004:347-352; Henne and Gabrielson 2012:152).  
Aquaculture initiatives undertaken with the help of international experts ensured that 
Chilean salmon began to appear on tables around the world and to account for nearly 5% 
of Chile’s export earnings by 2001 (Schurman 2004:320). 
The expansion of technocratic governance and efforts to depoliticize this 
governance have profoundly affected the region and its inhabitants.  As noted previously, 
Foucault’s definition of governmentality as “the conduct of conduct” operating at the 
scale of a predetermined population is useful here, as is Nikolas Rose’s definition of 
expertise as “authority arising out of a claim to knowledge, to neutrality, and to efficacy.” 
(Rose 2006:145) For Pinochet and the rest of the military regime, neutrality was central 
to their claim of legitimacy as was their claim of expertise, which was largely based on 
having foreign trained academics in charge of economic policy and on their ability to 
partner with foreign experts to reform the Chilean economy.   
 19 
Anthropologist Tania Li has described how “the will to improve” or develop is 
based on problematization, which she defines as “identifying deficiencies that need to be 
rectified” and what she terms “rendering technical.” (Li 2007:7) Questions that are 
rendered technical “are simultaneously rendered nonpolitical” and therefore “exclude the 
structure of political-economic relations from their diagnoses and prescriptions.” (Li 
2007:7) It is easy to see how this would appeal to a totalitarian government interested in 
placating its citizens without implementing democratic reforms or altering the status 
quo—and this was certainly the case in Pinochet’s Chile.  This “rendering technical” 
meant an expansion of state bureaucracy across the country, but perhaps nowhere more 
than in remote areas deemed to be of strategic economic and military importance.   
By far the most ambitious piece of Pinochet’s vision for the southern frontier, 
however, was the Carretera Austral.  Begun by Chilean army engineers in 1976, this 
highway literally cut through mountains and forests, connecting distant comunas 
throughout the region and making it possible for workers to commute from larger cities 
(Coyhaique and Puerto Aysén) to plants processing materials for export located along the 
coastline.  Today, though construction continues, the journey from Coyhaique to Puerto 
Aysén, which once involved five to ten hours of travel over rutted tracks and under 
waterfalls, takes just under an hour11 thanks to the túnel farellones.   
The authoritarian nature of the Pinochet dictatorship brought about massive 
infrastructure projects, depoliticized administration of resources, fewer restrictions on 
private enterprise, increased territorialization, securitization, and bureaucratization on the 
southern frontier as well as the expansion of radio and television—which provided 
                                                 
11 In good weather. 
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Chileans from Arica to Punta Arenas access to the same information, images, symbols, 
songs, and celebrities.   
Surely an autocratic regime which enjoyed widespread support during its early 
years,12 an absolute monopoly on the use of force, economists trained at the University of 
Chicago with missionary-like zeal for transforming the national economy, and 
preferential treatment from the IMF and commercial banks (Valdez 1995:2; Winn 
2004:26) should represent an “ideal type” for the study of how frontiers are settled from 
the top-down.  Given the strength of the state and the fastidious attention of state 
economists to the demand for and production of export commodities, Aysén should have 
only been a frontier for a period of time before becoming like the rest of Chile following 
the stabilization of the demand for resources and the related demand for labor in frontier 
industries.   
But conventional wisdom, which privileges the global marketplace and the state 
as the primary forces creating and demarcating frontiers, fails to account for the 
destabilizing effect of local knowledge and local networks.  Simply put, government 
officials in Santiago cannot see the harvesting and storing of firewood, the annual 
shearing of sheep, and the fishing—and illegal smuggling—that goes on in the region’s 
innumerable inlets.  Even the strongest state with the most repressive national security 
apparatus cannot exert total control over its citizens, and even in our era of hegemonic 
global capitalism (Harvey 2005) communities are motivated by more than the economy.  
If frontiers are unstable nodes in international networks, this provides opportunities for 
                                                 
12 Thanks largely to middle class resentment over the “economic chaos” of the Popular Unity years and 
subsequent junta propaganda that depicted the actions of the regime as “salvation” from Marxist guerillas 
and civil war (Stern 2006)  
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citizens living on the frontier to negotiate and contest state policies—even if they do not 
contest the state’s authority to implement them. 
Ironically, the very economic policies implemented by Pinochet and the “Chicago 
Boys”—and largely maintained by subsequent administrations following the return to 
democracy in 1990—have encouraged frontier residents to contest, circumvent, and 
ignore the plans of the supposedly strong state setting the stage for a return to the 
unsettled past.  The establishment of new laws protecting private property, the 
encouragement of foreign investment, the confiscation of land from indigenous and 
campesino cooperatives (Henne and Gabrielson 2012:52), and, above all, the destruction 
of the natural landscape for the sake of economic development (Carruthers 2001; 
Klubock 2004), paved the way for a series of transnational interventions into what had 
been previously perceived as domestic affairs.  One such intervention included the 
quiet—and legal—purchase of a vast tract of land in southern Chile, prompting an outcry 
from politicians on the right and left and further isolating the Aysén region, just as 
national infrastructure projects seemed poised to bring it “on line” with the rest of the 
country. 
Parallels in an Era of “Environmental Justice” 
Increasingly, “resource” frontiers from the tropics to the arctic have become 
environmental battlegrounds, as the scale of the human impact on the planet becomes 
more widely known.  As scientists debate the merits of employing the term 
“anthropocene” to our current moment, and politicians meet to discuss climate change, 
remote, often overlooked places like the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge in Alaska 
(ANWR), have become household names.  The opening of the Ecuadorian Amazon to oil 
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companies eager to tap newfound petroleum has sparked an outcry and a movement in 
which celebrities from outside Ecuador have taken part.  In this context, the ongoing 
battles over land rights and logging in the Brazilian Amazon seem like old news—and 
they are: these struggles have received international media attention since the 1980s 
(Tsing 2005). 
What is new is the extent to which scholars and ordinary, albeit concerned 
individuals, are paying attention to the full range of actors who make up what Michael 
Eilenberg has called “frontier constellations,” where processes of securitization, 
territorialization, agricultural expansion and migration combine and interact (Eilenberg 
2014:157).   In the case of resource frontiers, one might add processes of environmental 
protection and international media coverage to this list.  Anna Tsing has written 
extensively on how “nature loving” has come to be practiced by young Indonesians in a 
way that is connected to, yet that remains very distinct from, environmentalism as it is 
practiced by citizens in other parts of the world.  They learned similar ways of talking 
about and appreciating nature that aligned with international standards, yet made them 
“directly identifiable as Indonesian” in the process. (Tsing 2005:124) Tsing uses links 
between environmental mobilizations among rubber tappers in Brazil, the Chipko 
movement in northern India, and her own interlocutors in Indonesia to demonstrate how 
“activism moves in charismatic packages” (Tsing 2005:227-235) that enter new fields of 
meaning and of social action when they arrive in new geographical and social contexts. 
The conditions in the Aysén region—particularly the complex interactions 
between transnational environmental organizations, the state, and private industry—are at 
once uniquely Chilean and indicative of broader forces at work in the contemporary era.  
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Remote frontiers are often sites rich in natural resources, in part because the geological 
forces that have made these places rugged and inaccessible for much of human history 
are the same forces that create the kinds of resources that our species covets.  
Additionally, natural resource deposits close to large-scale human settlements have 
largely been exhausted from earlier exploitation.  It is no accident that much of the timber 
coming to market is extracted from densely forested and sparsely populated corners of 
Indonesia and, to a slightly lesser extent, southern Chile. 
In the Chilean case, the association of environmental activism with the left and 
the legacy of the right-wing military dictatorship have meant both that battles over the 
exploitation of nature in Chile often resemble the street battles over human rights abuses 
and political repression with marches that end in clashes with police and tear gas.  
Furthermore, this association means that at the national level, environmentalists make up 
a small group in a much broader coalition and therefore sit in the “back seat” while other 
social and political issues are addressed.  In the words of political scientist David 
Carruthers: 
The hardest critic of Chilean development has been the land itself… Even 
with diversification into 'non-traditional' commodities (such as wine, 
salmon, woodchips and luxury produce), the over- whelming bulk of the 
export platform (roughly 80% across the past dozen years) is comprised of 
minerals, agricultural commodities, and the products of once-lush forests 
and fisheries. Chile's fiercely unregulated economy provides ample reward 
for producers who push negative social and environmental costs onto 
future generations, vulnerable ecological systems or the poorest and most 
marginalized populations.  From the strip mines of the arid north to the 
scarred forests of Patagonia, the export boom has put the hard squeeze on 
nature. (2001:347) 
 
In Aysén, however, where a relatively small population spends much of its time at 
the mercy of the elements, local responses to environmental degradation are complicated 
and sometimes contradictory.  While in places like Santiago Chilean environmental 
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activists feel they are being ignored while other activism takes center stage13, in the far 
south residents fear that the opposite is true.  Chileans may be taking to hiking and 
trekking in record numbers as steady employment has allowed them the money to buy 
outdoor gear and the time to take vacations and get outdoors, but most Ayséninos still 
regard environmentalists as outsiders—and in many cases they are. 
Opponents of the proposed HidroAysén mega-project, which called for building 
five dams in the heart of Aysén on the Pasqua and Baker rivers, organized marches in 
Santiago, but the umbrella NGO Patagonia Sin Represas (Patagonia without Dams, PSR) 
largely responsible for mobilizing over 170,000 protestors over a period of five days in 
Santiago in 2011 (Varas et al. 2013) also staged protests in Barcelona and Paris.  This 
was critical in calling international attention to the plan, which would have dramatically 
altered the landscape in northern Patagonia—a fact brought home by PSR’s use of an 
image of electric transmission towers cutting through otherwise pristine Patagonian 
wilderness—and it may have helped legal challenges to the project that eventually 
stopped HidroAysén14, but it did nothing to reassure Ayséninos that activists, whether 
from Chile, the United States, or Europe, understood their plight.  Even Carlos15, the 
owner of an eco-lodge in Puerto Aysén that caters primarily to international tourists 
seeking the “pure” Patagonia they’ve seen in magazines and on television told me that 
                                                 
13 Today, the street protests in Santiago are largely organized by students who have coalesced around the 
issue of education reform.  The cost of attending university has climbed largely as a result of the neoliberal 
policies implemented during the Pinochet years, and the Concertación and subsequent democratic 
administrations—including that of current president, Michelle Bachelet—have failed to stem rising costs. 
 
14 The demonstrations convinced Chile’s second largest bank, BBVA, to back out of providing loans for the 
project (Vince 2010:382).  Eventually, with opposition growing and in the face of numerous legal 
challenges, the Bachelet regime withdrew its support for the project.  Today, though it is still mired in the 
Chilean courts, the project appears to be dead, though other, smaller hydroelectric projects, such as the one 
at Rio Cuervo, continue (El Mercurio April 4, 2014). 
 
15 A pseudonym. 
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while clear cutting kilometers of forest to build towers and run transmission lines would 
be “a crime,” he supported hydroelectric development in the region since currently Aysén 
has the most expensive electricity in the country and “something must be done.” 
Adding to perceptions of environmentalists as “outsiders” who are unconcerned 
with the residents of the region they are seeking to protect is the work of the late Douglas 
Tompkins, who died as the result of a kayaking accident in December 2015.  Tompkins 
was a young climber from California when he first came to Chile in the 1960s where he 
was inspired by the “pure” nature that he found there.  Decades later, after founding the 
Esprit and North Face clothing companies he took advantage of Chilean laws that 
encouraged foreign investment and fiercely protected private property and began buying 
land north of the famous Volcán Corcovado.   
Tompkins’ intentions may have been noble but his moves quickly unnerved 
locals.  Rumors of his eviction of shepherds used to grazing their flocks on the largely 
uninhabited land north of Corcovado and his hosting “suspicious foreigners”16 have not 
helped to change local perceptions of Tompkins as a meddlesome outsider.  Perhaps most 
importantly, the location of Tompkins’ Parque Pumalín at one of the narrowest parts of 
Chile means that it bisects the country, extending from the border with Argentina to the 
Pacific Ocean.  By the time Tomkins had acquired 670,000 acres in 1995 Chilean 
politicians from both the right and left were calling his moves a threat to national security 
(Spooner 2011:110).  His park is one reason—although not the only reason—that the Pan 
American highway, which runs from north to south from Arica on the Peruvian Border to 
                                                 
16One rumor claims his ultimate aim is to create a new Jewish homeland in northern Patagonia, a dubious 
“fact” whose Chilean proponents claim is supported by the presence of Israeli tourists in Patagonia. 
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Puerto Montt in the Región de los Lagos has not been extended further south into 
Patagonia. 
Even in death17, Tompkins remains a polarizing figure.  The announcement of his 
death on the website of El Mercurio, Chile’s largest newspaper generated comments 
praising him as a “gringo” who did what Chileans had never bothered to do for 
themselves and their natural patrimony as well as comments damning him as a schemer 
and an imperialist, and he and Parque Pumalin continue to be frequent topics of 
discussion among Ayséninos but his case represents the complex reality of transnational 
governmentality in Patagonia.   
As Gupta and Ferguson observe, “many of the ‘grassroots groups’ opposing 
globalization are themselves arguably leading examples of it: well organized 
transnational organizations with offices or affiliations spread out across the world.” 
(2002:990) PSR, which received significant donations from Tompkins, represents one 
such organization whose mobilization of transnational networks to oppose the 
construction of hydroelectric dams in Patagonia—and whose images of proposed power 
lines cutting through the spectacular landscape became a key visual of the opposition 
movement—continues to have real effects on the lives of Chilean citizens, especially in 
Aysén. 
Environmental organizations, from PSR to Greenpeace to the Waterkeeper 
Alliance18 have become a part of the political landscape on the southern frontier, as have 
similar organizations in other parts of the world.  But here, parallels become difficult to 
                                                 
17 Tompkins died in the hospital in Coyhaique in December 2015 after contracting hypothermia in a 
kayaking accident. 
 
18 The president of the Waterkeeper Alliance is Robert F. Kennedy, Jr. who recently appeared in the 
bilingual Patagonia Journal paddling a kayak of his own on the Futaleufú River in northern Aysén. 
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find.  In Aysén, where locals feel that their own economic situation is precarious, their 
reaction to efforts to preserve the landscape is highly contingent.  Furthermore, that 
Tompkins and other environmentalists have taken actions that residents see as preventing 
the completion of infrastructure projects vital to the incorporation of the region into the 
rest of the country—and therefore vital to improving their quality of life —complicates 
the relationship between the state, its citizens, and transnational organizations further.  In 
this context, new forms of transnational governance that are predicated on European and 
North American understandings of “nature” do not create predictable outcomes. 
“Environmental Citizenship” and Double Alienation  
Political scientist Alex Latta and sociologist Hannah Wittman have recently 
argued for engaging with the concept of “environmental citizenship,” citing a growing 
body of literature on environmental justice in Latin America, which also addresses 
questions of democracy and participation.  Their argument, that “socio-political subjects 
are mutually constituted with the ecological practices and institutions that they create” 
(2012:1) bears repeating here, as it succinctly summarizes the situation—both historical 
and contemporary—in Aysén.  Ayséninos understand themselves through their 
relationship with the Patagonian landscape, and make both short and long-term choices 
based on the limits imposed by the harsh climate of southern Chile.  Their frequent 
criticism of the government in Santiago is firmly based on an understanding—not 
altogether inaccurate—that the politicians up north cannot understand the conditions in 
the cold and rainy south.  Recent work in political ecology, like recent scholarship on 
frontiers, points to parallels to be found throughout Latin America, and indeed throughout 
the world, where social movements are seeking to make the rights of and to nature a 
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centerpiece of political reform (Gudynas 2011).  In arguing for “environmental 
citizenship” Latta and Wittman have suggested that “rethinking the territorial basis for 
citizenship helps make sense of the growth of transnational activist networks,” (2012:5) 
but this falls flat if citizens living on “resource frontiers” cannot find common ground or 
common cause with activists promoting environmental conservation and preservation, 
and thus fail to see themselves as part of these activist networks. Residents like Carlos, 
mentioned in the previous section, may want to see Patagonia remain wild and pristine, 
but they cannot afford to pay their electric bills under current conditions. 
Thus, Ayséninos tend not to see themselves aligned with nature against a 
rapacious state, but rather find themselves in a space that has been alternately constructed 
as a resource economy essential for national development and as a kind of “pure” 
wilderness that must be defended as part of the world’s patrimony.  Residents are now 
subject to two powerful external forces—for the visions of nature to which they are 
increasingly exposed to not represent their lived experiences. On the one hand, expanded 
state bureaucracy, securitization, and regulation of land use—all hallmarks of 
territorialization—have created a “host of mundane rituals and procedures” (Ferguson 
and Gupta 2002:984) in which residents must take part to perform their responsibilities 
and claim their rights, and the benefits of various programs available to them, as citizens.  
On the other, transnational non-governmental environmental organizations and activists 
wield increasing power in the region and are seeking to establish rules where the 
government in Santiago either has no policy, or where they deem its policies deficient.  
These organizations are also challenging some of the very development initiatives that 
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residents view as providing their best option for improving their quality of life in an 
unforgiving region. 
The result has been a kind of “double alienation” for residents.  Increased state 
bureaucracy and development programs aimed at increasing exports for the global 
marketplace fail to take the needs of frontier citizens into account, even as these 
programs require the participation of citizens as unskilled labor.  Perhaps the best recent 
example of this comes from the proposed HidroAysén project.  While this project, which 
would have employed Ayséninos as construction workers building dams and transmission 
towers, the energy generated by the dams was to be transmitted directly to the densely 
populated Región Metropolitana and the copper mines in the Atacama desert. 
Furthermore, the perception among many Ayséninos that they are seen as second-class 
citizens is exacerbated by the state’s willingness to provide higher pay and other benefits 
to employees from outside the region who have the technical training to provide the 
expertise necessary to serve as supervisors and managers at work sites19 through the zona 
system (for state employees) and other incentives (for private employees working in 
businesses affiliated with the state, such as Banco Estado).  At the same time, residents 
who see themselves as a part of the landscape and who are proud to call such a ruggedly 
beautiful region home—and who might otherwise align themselves with 
environmentalists who are aiming to preserve the region—find themselves and their 
                                                 
19 Aysén is the only region in Chile without a single university.  The result is that residents seeking 
secondary education must leave the region in order to study and many do not return, either because they 
have made connections elsewhere in the course of their studies or because they have better opportunities 
elsewhere upon graduation.  Nearly all of the interlocutors I spoke to with grown children informed me that 
their children had studied in other parts of the country (Valdivia and Concepción are the two most common 
destinations) and now reside elsewhere. 
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needs overlooked by transnational and national environmental organizations and activists 
like PSR and Doug Tompkins, who seem care more about trees and pumas than people.    
This “double alienation” from the state and its initiatives and from transnational 
environmental organizations and the strategies that it engenders will be explored in 
greater detail in the remaining sections of this paper.  In Aysén, as in other remote 
corners of the world where residents are seeking to provide for themselves and their 
families in precarious yet environmentally significant areas, the only option is tactical 
navigation between these two forms of governmentality. There are opportunities—and 
hazards—in dealing with both, and novel formations, alliances, and practices appear to 
offer the best way forward for frontier residents.  The range of local responses to ad hoc 
practical and site-specific state strategies (Ong, from Rose, 2006:100) have revealed the 
limits of both new and long-standing technologies for governing life on the frontier.  
Political, economic, and social responses to state policies are highly productive, uniting a 
heterogeneous population with diverse political views, origins, and understandings of the 
landscape itself.   
A New Subsidy for “Vulnerable” Families 
Firewood has been the primary means for powering stoves in Aysén since the first 
colonos (colonists) arrived, and it remains the only viable option for heat throughout most 
of the region today.20 As has been previously noted, when protestors took to the streets 
throughout Aysén in February 2011 with a list of demands, perhaps the most salient of 
these were centered around the high cost of living on the southern frontier.  Complaints 
concerned the cost of electricity and water, which are the highest and second highest 
                                                 
20 One of the few exceptions is the comuna of Chile Chico, where the proximity to the border, either via the 
road to the popular tourist town of Perito Moreno, Argentina or via Lago General Carrera, means that 
residents can cross into Argentina to buy cheap propane and natural gas. 
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utility costs, respectively, incurred by residents of any region in Chile.  Electricity and 
water, however, are complicated to administer, and require significant infrastructure to 
deliver.  Any immediate move to placate residents and reopen the roads that serve as 
arteries for the region’s industries would have to be based on something simpler and 
more readily at hand for the sake of rapid implementation. 
The Fondo de Solidaridad e Inversión Social (FOSIS) is an agency within the 
Chilean government that falls under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Social 
Development.  It was founded in October 1990 under the direction of president Patricio 
Aylwin, who famously implemented a series of social programs to repay what he defined 
as a “debt” that the government had incurred for the disappearances, torture, and other 
human rights violations committed during the military dictatorship years. (Han 2011)  
The FOSIS mission statement reads: “Liderar estrategias de superación de la pobreza y 
vulnerabilidad de personas, familias y comunidades, contribuyendo a disminuir las 
desigualdades de manera innovadora y participativa” (“Leading strategies for overcoming 
poverty and vulnerability for individuals, families, and communities, helping to reduce 
inequality in an innovate and participatory manner.” (FOSIS website, emphasis added)   
As a state agency, FOSIS operates offices in every region of Chile in order to 
provide social services throughout the country.  In Aysén, FOSIS maintains a presence in 
all 10 comunas and has a full time staff of forty-four employees operating out of two 
offices in Coyhaique and one each in Cochrane, Puerto Aysén, La Junta, and Chile Chico.  
Their regional director is a short, intensely energetic woman named Claudia Poveda 
Caceres who laughs easily and organizes furiously.  During our meeting, she informed 
me that FOSIS is not only concerned with familias pobres (poor families), but with 
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familias vulnerables, echoing the focus on vulnerability found on the agency’s website.  
She said that her staff was always looking for ways to be “closer to the people” in order 
to work “on the dynamic problems experienced by families,” especially unemployment, 
imprisonment, and alcoholism.21  The FOSIS employees in Aysén come from a range of 
backgrounds—Claudia mentioned lawyers, journalists, and engineers working out of the 
Coyhaique office—and come from Aysén as well as other regions.  However, as Claudia 
noted, there are not enough professionals in the region to fully staff the agency due to the 
lack of training available and the absence of a local university. 
When FOSIS was charged with implementing a firewood “bonus” for residents of 
Aysén in 2012, everyone in the Coyhaique office knew that this would amount to a 
challenge.  For one, this would be a new subsidy, unique to Aysén, and thus there was no 
national precedent to draw on for guidance.  Furthermore, the subsidy would target 
families deemed “vulnerable” via a complex system of “points” determined by annual 
income, land holdings, occupation, number of family members, and a variety of other 
factors.  But not all of the “vulnerable” families across Aysén were in the FOSIS 
database, and many of those who were lived in places so remote as to be inaccessible for 
the large trucks that transported firewood for most of the winter months. FOSIS would 
work with the regional government to buy up and redistribute firewood, but they had no 
one on staff with experience cutting or transporting firewood. 
The result, Claudia informed me, was “chaos.”  Initial attempts to buy and 
redistribute firewood to 16,000 qualifying families throughout Aysén had disastrous 
                                                 
21 It is a FOSIS policy to provide all subsidies to the female head of household whenever possible.  Women, 
as it was explained to me, can be counted on to redistribute the money to extended family living under the 
same roof and to spend the money on food and winter clothing for children.  In the past, when subsidies 
were given to the male head of household, female family members came to the FOSIS office to complain 
that most of that money was spent on alcohol.   
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consequences.  With the government buying up large quantities of firewood, the price 
skyrocketed, jumping from $13,000 Chilean pesos per cubic meter (roughly $24 USD in 
2012) to $30-33,000 pesos per cubic meter (between $50 and $55 USD at the current rate 
of exchange).  The results were predictable: middle class families who didn’t qualify for 
the subsidy suddenly found themselves with higher heating costs and many residents who 
had previously worked in other industries rushed to enter the firewood market, either 
cutting wood or transporting it. 
Despite the obvious setbacks—and massive dissatisfaction on the part of the local 
populace—FOSIS pressed on with its mandate to provide the subsidy, and in so doing 
displayed remarkable flexibility.  Going into the subsidy’s second year, the agency 
switched from attempting to buy and redistribute firewood to providing cash bonuses of 
$100,000 pesos (roughly $167 USD) with which residents could buy their own firewood 
from their traditional suppliers.  They also continued to seek out and enroll new qualified 
families22 expanding the initial enrollment from 16,000 families to 23,690 by 2014 
(Caceres, personal communication).  This new system, providing cash rather than 
firewood itself, has led to new challenges and to strange sights: the day after our 
interview, Claudia traveled with the regional manager of Banco Estado, two cashiers 
from the bank, three carabineros and an armored truck to the island community at 
Melinka (population 1,400) by ferry in order to distribute subsidies there. 
But for all the “chaos,” or perhaps because of it, the introduction of the firewood 
subsidy in 2012 provided residents—including those who did not qualify for the 
                                                 
22 They even rolled out a new section of their website where residents can enter their RUT (Chilean 
national identity number) and see if they qualify, though Claudia freely admitted that this was little help 
when it came to providing services to families who didn’t have internet access either because they could 
not afford it or because they were older and had never learned to use the internet—or in some cases what it 
is. 
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subsidy—with opportunities to tactically shift their practices in order to profit from the 
state’s intervention and, as we shall see later, complicated other state objectives (notably 
efforts to curb air pollution) both within the region and across the country. 
Novel Responses and New Formations in an Old Industry 
 
In response to the introduction of the subsidy, or more accurately, to a state 
agency getting involved in the firewood market, residents who had previously been 
engaged in small scale or part time operations—either cutting or transporting firewood—
embraced new practices.  Tania Li has written about the apparent contradictions in 
capitalism on the frontier, synthesizing Marx and Polyani to demonstrate how 
“intervention is a condition of growth in the capitalist mode” as experts regulate markets 
by restricting land use and regulating local practices as government expands its reach. 
(2007:19-21) Through expert interventions, governments are able to “sustain and 
optimize processes” rather than to exert total control.  This creates space in which actors 
can operate tactically to take advantage of oversights, errors, or loopholes in official 
policy as well as to benefit from the conditions created by state interventions.    
In Coyhaique and Puerto Aysén, the region’s two largest cities, groups of 
firewood transporters came together to form what they termed “cooperatives.”  One such 
cooperative was Coleña Aysén.  I had the good fortune to meet one of its cofounders, a 
middle-aged man named Gilberto,23 who still wears the black Coleña baseball cap24 years 
after the cooperative’s heyday and subsequent decline.  Gilberto told me that the idea for 
the cooperative first emerged when the Corporación Nacional Forestal (Conaf, a semi-
                                                 
23 A pseudonym. 
 
24 The members of Coleña Aysén had hats and fleeces embroidered with the cooperative’s logo.  This is 
actually quite common in Chile, where employees—especially men—show loyalty and pride in their 
workplace by wearing the corporate logo or slogan to social events after work hours. 
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autonomous state agency tasked with regulating the timber and firewood industries and 
operating Chile’s national parks and reserves) introduced new measures designed to 
insure that firewood being sold throughout the region was dry in order to reduce 
pollution, since damp wood produces more smoke.  The cooperative really took shape in 
2012, however, and Gilberto was its president during the organization’s most successful 
period from 2012-2013.  Though they had begun organizing before the FOSIS subsidy 
was introduced, the sudden jump in prices and the need for ride-along laborers (who do 
not own trucks themselves, but help to load the trucks in the countryside where the wood 
is cut) meant that many men who had previously worked only part time and 
independently joined the cooperative.  When the subsidy was announced and FOSIS 
began to contract with the cooperatives in order to buy in larger volume, Gilberto and the 
men of Coleña Aysén sold more than 2,000 cubic meters of firewood in the first ten days 
of their contract with FOSIS (Field notes 7/9/2015). 
Today, FOSIS’s strategic shift from the redistribution of firewood to the dispersal 
of cash bonuses has diminished the need for and profitability of cooperatives.  Gilberto 
told me during our conversation that he estimates only 50% of those transporting and 
selling firewood in Puerto Aysén belong to the cooperative in 2015.  He told me with 
ambivalence, “en Chile no tenemos una cultura cooperativa” (“in Chile we do not have a 
cooperative culture”) however the short term success of the cooperatives in organizing to 
meet new Conaf regulations and in mobilizing to take advantage of the FOSIS policy in 
2012 and the accompanying “chaos” it brought to the firewood market is striking.  Rather 
than chafing under government restrictions or policies that affected how they could sell 
firewood, local actors within the industry responded quickly and in novel ways to meet 
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these new challenges and to improve their economic wellbeing.  This response was surely 
connected to the need for improvisation that has historically been an essential part of 
living on the frontier, as well as to the informal networks that have bound the community 
together since before Pinochet.  Chile may not have a “cultura cooperativa,” but Aysén 
does, and it always has. 
 Though he is no longer president of the cooperative, Gilberto has taken 
advantage of the subsidy to improve his position within Puerto Aysén and to enhance his 
own economic position.  While previously he traveled with only one truck, he used the 
money he made during the early days of the subsidy to buy a second flatbed truck and he 
frequently borrows a third from a friend in order to take a “convoy” to sites where wood 
is cut and stacked.  With three men in each cab, he is able to bring back between 50 and 
100 cubic meters per trip, and then is able to store this in an almacén (storehouse) outside 
of town and sell it at his own pace—and to take advantage of seasonal price fluctuations 
that affect those who do not have enough space to store sufficient firewood to get through 
the winter.  This strategy—making fewer trips with more workers to bring back larger 
quantities—reduces his risk during the winter months when the weather and local roads 
are unpredictable and keeps the journey, which others must make every 10-15 days, from 
becoming what he calls “an adventure.” 
But Gilberto and other middlemen are not the only ones taking advantage of new 
and often contradictory policies with regards to firewood.  Gualterio,25 who studied 
forestry and has a number of very strong opinions on the state’s regulation of the timber 
industry and maintenance of reserves and national parks, also took advantage of the 
“chaos” of 2011-2012.  I met him in front of the two storey house he is building for 
                                                 
25 A pseudonym 
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himself in Puerto Aysén, and when I asked him about the subsidy, he informed me 
matter-of-factly: “pienso que el estado sea responsable por la costa de la leña ahora,”  
(“I think the state is responsible for the price of firewood now”) and lamented how the 
massive price increase caused by the FOSIS intervention meant that anyone who could 
was selling any firewood they could get their hands on, regardless of the quality.  No one, 
he said, who sold independently wanted to wait to cure the wood so that it would burn 
cleanly and safely (Field Notes 7/8/2015). 
He brought me to the back of his camioneta to reveal that the flatbed was full of 
gnarled wood that he had collected.  Though it wasn’t cut into the flat, straight, meter 
long segments found on the back of the Coleña trucks, it was indeed very dry.  “Los 
bosques aquí estan llena de esta,” (“the forests around here are full of this stuff”) he said, 
but Conaf’s policy regarding its collection is something of a “gray area.”  They have 
restricted access to the region’s reserves and parks, but this was, in Gualterio’s words, 
only because it was easier for them to monitor the cutting of new stands of trees than the 
recovery of deadwood from the forest floor.  He cited the risk of incendios forestales 
(wildfires)26 as one of the reasons he thought it was irresponsible for Conaf not to allow 
individuals to collect what had fallen naturally to the forest floor.  When I asked him if he 
had gone into the reserves and parks to collect what he had in the back of his truck he 
laughed and shook his head, telling me that he goes to “lugares que conozco” (places he 
knows)—presumably private land where he can operate with the permission of the 
owner. 
                                                 
26 Chileans in the south have always been sensitive to the risks posed by wildfires, but have been especially 
attuned to the issue since 2005, when a fire set inadvertently by a Czech backpacker in Torres del Paine 
National Park burned more than 13,000 hectares.  Another fire in the same park in 2012 consumed roughly 
the same amount of virgin forest and scrubland.  
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The Place of the Region in a National Conversation 
 
Before we parted ways, Gualterio complained that in Chile, organizations like 
Conaf are always public-private enterprises and as such are expected to make money.  As 
has been documented elsewhere, the neoliberal mandate that Conaf finance itself has led 
to the organization collecting a portion of the revenue from unsustainable “chipping,” 
converting Chile’s hardwood forests into the raw materials for wood pulp (Carruthers 
2001:349).  Beyond the conflict of interest this represents for an organization that is also 
tasked with protecting Chile’s forests, Gualtario noted two other problems with the way 
Conaf functions: first, the organization operates like a corporation with a director, and 
second, because this director is appointed, he functions like a politician. 
The introduction of the subsidy in 2012 may have been exclusive to the Aysén 
region, but its implementation has taken place in the midst of a national conversation on 
contaminación (air pollution).  During my fieldwork during the winter of 2015, the 
pollution in Santiago was national news as a state of emergency was declared and 
families with small children and grandparents were encouraged to keep them indoors.  I 
was told several times by reputable sources—and perhaps less reputable but no less 
emphatic sources—that Coyhaique is the second most polluted city in the country 
because of its rapid growth and residents’ reliance on wood burning stoves for heat in the 
winter months.  Coyhaique, like Santiago, is surrounded by mountains and the low-
hanging smoke generated by thousands of homes is plainly visible from the roadway as 
one descends towards the city from the west. 
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In June 2015, the long-simmering conflict between the heating industry and 
government agencies seeking to regulate Chile’s nation-wide pollution problem exploded 
in the press.  In response to Deputy David Sandoval’s assertion that the region needed to 
change the way residents heat their homes in the face of a massive pollution problem, the 
head of Conaf’s office for Forest Development, José Urrutia shot back: 
El producto leña es quizás más democrático que hay, porque beneficia a 
una infinidad de familias que poseen predios, por lo tanto el beneficio del 
comercio de la leña que en nuestra región significa cerca de 25 millones 
de dólares, beneficia a aproximadamente 700 familias de la región, eso no 
ocurría con la energía eléctrica o el gas donde nosotros sabemos cómo se 
concentraría todo ese volumen de recursos en uno, dos o tres 
proveedores. 
 
Firewood as a product is perhaps the most democratic there is, because it 
benefits countless families who own parcels of land, and therefore the 
commerce in firewood means around $25 million USD, benefitting 
approximately 700 families in the region, and this will not occur with 
electric energy or gas where we know how the volume of these resources 
will be concentrated in the hands of one, two, or three suppliers. (El 
Divisadero, p. 24, Año XXII, No. 6286 July 1, 2015) 
 
This exchange—along with the strategies employed by Gualterio and his stated 
reasoning for employing them—highlights several key features of the relationship 
between state and citizen on the southern frontier.  First, while citizen understandings of 
the state as “vertically encompassing” may indeed be grounded in the “routinized 
practices of state bureaucracies” (Ferguson and Gupta 2002:983) these understandings 
are challenged as much by evident conflicts between government representatives and 
agencies and by politics of scale as they are by the increased influence of transnational 
actors.   
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Sandoval,27 the deputy representing Aysén in Santiago, has cast his concerns 
about the firewood industry and his desire for new forms of energy in the region as an 
environmental concern and one that is in line with national concerns over air pollution.  
Urrutia, on the other hand, has cast his defense of firewood as better aligned with 
“democracy” and economic opportunities for all families at the local level—in the 
process positioning Conaf not as an organization concerned primarily with protecting 
nature (despite its mandate to operate and oversee Chile’s national parks and reserves) 
but as an organization that will defend family-based small business in order for a more 
fair distribution of income across the region.  Furthermore, the conflict between Sandoval 
and Urrutia suggests that Gualterio’s understanding of Conaf directors as political actors 
is mostly accurate. 
 While Chile has been slow to implement policies to protect the environment in the 
face of industry and development due to its economic reliance on the export of natural 
resources (Carruthers 2001) this has begun to change thanks to international discourses of 
environmental conservation and the increased presence of transnational environmental 
organizations in Chile. Efforts to maintain the frontier as a depoliticized space through 
the direction of experts insulated “from external political attempts to govern them and 
their decisions and actions” (Rose 2002:155) are increasingly challenged as politicians 
and citizens make use of emergent environmental discourses.  This has prompted 
organizations, like Conaf—which suddenly finds itself out of step with 
                                                 
27 It is worth noting that Sandoval’s party, the Unión Demócrata Independiente (UDI) is widely recognized 
as the party of Pinochet, and is generally understood to favor economic progress over environmental 
protection and the concentration of wealth among Chile’s elite political class over redistribution of wealth 
and social programs.  Firewood, an industry wherein regulations have both economic and environmental 
consequences, often causes politicians to take positions contradictory to what might otherwise be expected. 
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environmentalists—to seek new strategies (such as economic opportunity and better 
income distribution within industries) in order to justify their policies. 
 Thus, the frontier has become a re-politicized space where state actors, from 
agencies like Conaf and FOSIS, to individuals like Sandoval and Urrutia, debate long-
standing practices.  Where previous technocratic governance, which saw its apex during 
the dictatorship years, but which largely continued during the democratic regimes of the 
1990s, presented the state and its agencies as unified in their drive towards “progress” 
and economic development, today concerns about economic justice and environmental 
protection are seen as legitimate and pressing.  Conflicts between state actors have 
undermined local understandings of the government as “vertical and encompassing” even 
as citizens still look to the state to set policies and expand infrastructure.  When policies 
conflict with the interest of citizens, citizens increasingly employ environmentalist 
discourses, like the need to collect deadwood from the forest floor to reduce the risk of 
wildfire, to justify their defiance of state policies.  If experts and politicians fail to 
understand conditions on the southern frontier, be they economic, environmental, or 
practical, this justifies political challenges—either direct, as in the case of the “uprising” 
in 2011, or indirect as in the clandestine use of parks and reserves as sites for wood-
collection or the selling of wood that does not meet Conaf’s quality standards.  The 
introduction of the FOSIS subsidy demonstrates the state’s concern with the frontier 
population’s wellbeing.    PSR, the Waterkeeper Alliance, Doug Tompkins and other 
environmental actors’ legal challenges to the HidroAysén project and other efforts to 
expand infrastructure—and the success of these challenges—demonstrates international 
concern for the wellbeing of the natural landscape.  Thus, the application of local 
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knowledge at the intersection of international and national priorities creates a space for 
Ayséninos to exercise a degree of political autonomy they have not known since 1973. 
Local Knowledge 
 
Local knowledge is critical in Aysén, not only for locals navigating and exploiting 
conditions created by state interventions, but also for “outsiders” seeking to gain 
credibility with locals at work sites.  This starts with firewood knowledge.  Fire in Aysén 
remains a basic necessity. Knowing what constitutes good firewood, knowing how to 
build a fire and knowing how to keep the fire burning late into the night, are all ways of 
knowing how to live in Aysén, and this local knowledge differentiates both Ayséninos 
and “outsiders” who have mastered this knowledge from residents of other regions.  As 
the monument depicting the colono with his boat full of leña at Los Palos attests, the 
firewood industry has been at the center of life in Ayén since the first settlers arrived in 
the early twentieth century.  Locals grow up in front of the woodstove. 
But this way of life is mostly unknown to Chileans living north of Puerto Montt, 
and completely unknown to Chileans living in the Región Metropolitana—nearly one 
third of the country’s total population.  Today it is illegal to operate a woodstove or 
fireplace in many of the comunas that comprise greater Santiago, due to concerns about 
air pollution in the capital.28 Numerous inhabitants of Aysén, both long-time residents 
and relative newcomers, informed me that their region was unique in the centrality of 
firewood in daily life.  Countless dinner table conversations became sites of informal 
                                                 
28 Although there are ongoing battles over which comunas have passed these kinds of restrictions.  Many 
of the eastern portions of the city, notably the affluent communities of Los Condes, La Reina, and Lo 
Barnachea have no such laws, prompting criticism that the wealthy are allowed to operate their fireplaces 
for the sake of ambiance, while the poor and working class are denied the right for the “greater good.” In a 
June 23, 2015 interview with El Mercurio, Jaime Leyton, head of the Meteorological Office of Chile noted 
that Los Condes has the best air quality in Santiago, despite consuming the most firewood, because of its 
elevation relative to lower, poorer, districts in the city.   
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“knowledge exchanges,” with friends swapping the phone numbers of their firewood 
deliverymen29 and chatting about the quality of their last purchase. 
Even the state—divided though its agents may be on issues of pollution and 
regulation within the firewood industry—continues to treat firewood as the only means 
for heat.  In Puerto Aysén, both completed and ongoing housing projects designed to 
provide affordable housing for qualifying families are constructed around the idea of a 
central woodstove.  While these “state of the art” homes have a gas line and small cement 
patio for a propane tank that will power a gas stove for cooking and a hot water heater, 
they have no central heating.  Instead, residents are expected to move in with wood 
burning stoves and, upon deciding where they want them relative to the floor plan (much 
as one might do with a sofa or dining room set), either install their own chimney or hire a 
contractor to complete the necessary installation.  Each occupied house in the completed 
development had its own chimney, and the variety of construction methods, designs, 
sizes, and locations for these chimneys stood out against the uniform design and color of 
otherwise identical structures.  Across the street, where houses are not yet ready for 
occupancy, the houses remain pristine, awaiting occupants who will eventually install 
wood burning stoves. 
This highlights a central aspect of life in Aysén: hyper-modern practices that have 
developed since the supposed economic “miracle” exist alongside practices that have not 
changed in centuries.  Homes with satellite dishes and late-model SUVs in the driveway 
also require covered storage and wood palates for woodpiles.  The easiest way to tell if 
someone is at home is still to look up and see how much smoke is emanating from a 
creosote-encrusted chimney.  In a country where income inequality continues to rise and 
                                                 
29 Or in many cases, the wives of the deliverymen who coordinate deliveries from home. 
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the differences between rich and poor citizens are painfully obvious, in Aysén the 
reliance on firewood effects everyday practices across the socio-economic spectrum. 
At a dinner attended by both professionals who had come to the region for work 
and several local colleagues who had grown up in Aysén, firewood and firewood 
knowledge were the basis for inclusive conversation between supervisors and employees 
and provided an opportunity for the “transplants” to prove that they belonged, or at least 
that they were acclimating to their new surroundings.  Ronaldo,30 the regional manager 
for a national bank whose expensive car and recent trip to New York and Miami easily 
marked him as an outsider, was able to hold forth to several of his employees on how he 
learned the proper way to build a chimney so that the woodstove could draw properly and 
so that smoke was not drawn back into the house.  Florencia,31 an architect by training 
who works for the government agency SEREMI (Secretario Regional Ministerial) 
complained that having a woodstove in the house is like having another person to take 
care of.  She described the questions she had to ask herself and her husband in order to 
get through the winter, to the amusement of the assembled guests: “Did you feed the 
fire,” and “How is the fire today?”  While her frustration with the need to tend to her 
woodstove may have marked her as an outsider (had she grown up in Aysén these 
questions might not have struck her as odd or as anthropomorphizing the stove) the 
affirming nods from around the table—from Chileans who had grown up elsewhere and 
from locals— implied a solidarity based on shared labor and shared experience that cut 
across class lines.  As long as the discussion was about chimneys, the price and quality of 
                                                 
30 A pseudonym. 
 
31 Also a pseudonym. 
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firewood, and the work involved in keeping the fire going, everyone could participate on 
a level playing field. 
El Incendio 
June 29, 2015 
 Walking back from the bus terminal for Buses Suray, I discover that the street 
where I’ve been living in Puerto Aysén has changed dramatically during my weekend 
absence.  At the corner of Eusebio Ibar and Eleuterio Ramirez, four houses burned late 
on Saturday night, leaving holes in the once crowded streetscape.  Miraculously, the 
house closest to the road survived unscathed apart from dark smudges on the exterior 
where billowing smoke discolored the blue paint. The houses to the right—a two-story 
building that I am later told belonged to two families—and to the left were not lucky 
enough to escape the fire.  Local bomberos responded in time to douse the flames or keep 
them from spreading further, and even managed to keep the houses from burning to the 
ground, but the damage is enough.  The houses, and all their contents, were destroyed. 
 I pass as the near constant drizzle of the Patagonian winter soaks workers and 
bystanders alike, and as the family and perhaps a few of their friends sift through what is 
left of the structure to the left of the only house spared by the early morning blaze.  Their 
work appears to be less about what can be salvaged and more about clearing the space 
so that a new structure can be erected as soon as possible. Two middle-aged women are 
working alongside three middle-aged men in sweaters.  Their faces are blank as they 
shovel debris into waiting wheelbarrows.  Nearby, two girls, perhaps thirteen and eight 
years old, are helping by sweeping ash and the remnants of charred objects—a melted 
spatula, a half-burned calendar—into piles and then lifting these into the wheelbarrow by 
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hand.  Several workmen in blue and orange jumpsuits are wordlessly lifting larger 
objects—collapsed roof beams and chunks of cracked cement from the foundation—into 
the back of a truck.  Soon, they retrieve chainsaws from the truck’s cab, and begin to 
deliberately saw what remained of the frame into smaller pieces to be carted away.  
Before the afternoon is over, the house will go from a skeleton, still marginally protected 
by the blackened and twisted corrugated aluminum that was once its roof, to a blank 
space, an empty foundation.  Throughout the afternoon, the men of the family and the 
workmen take turns with chainsaws and hammers, pulling nails and carefully 
deconstructing all that remained of the home where just Friday I saw the girls playing 
with a goat that was tethered to the fence.  This fence too, like the houses, has been 
flattened, though in the case of the fence this flattening was deliberate to make room for 
the pickup trucks that would cart away the debris from the fire. 
The other house to the right of the house skipped by the flames and the two-story, 
two-family home slightly behind are still standing with all their charred contents and 
shattered windows.  No effort has yet been undertaken to reclaim anything inside that 
might have survived or to begin disassembly of the structures themselves.  In the front 
windows of the house that faced the street, pink curtains are still hanging—sooty and in 
tatters—in what is left of the downstairs.  How the corner house managed to survive I 
have no idea. 
As I slowly make my way towards my own home, less than a block away, the older 
of the two girls looks up from her dirty work and stares at me.  For a moment our eyes 
meet.  She appears impassive and emotionless, incapable of grief or joy, as she wipes her 
hands on her pants.  Then she looks back down and continues her work, giving quiet 
 47 
instructions to her younger sister.  I feel like an intruder, like my presence is a further 
affront to a family that has lost everything and just wants to get on with their work.  
Though I am not the only onlooker, my outsider’s perspective on the devastation and the 
family’s resolve, the collective labor undertaken to produce whatever comes next for the 
victims of fire in Aysén, make me feel like my gaze and curiosity are somehow an 
invasion. 
I walk home, trying to process the sights that greeted me seconds after getting off 
the bus.  When I return hours later, the wooden frame and twisted aluminum that formed 
the skeleton of the first house, and the family members themselves, are gone.  All that 
remains is the rectangular foundation, swept clean, and the warped cocina.  It is likely 
the culprit—the source of the cinders that ignited the blaze after the family went to bed—
and yet it remains.  Still intact, this survivor stands alone in the now all-but-vacant lot. 
Living with Danger 
 While firewood represents a means for heating your home and remaining 
comfortable during the long Patagonian winter, it also represents a danger that is never 
far from the surface.  During the seven weeks I was in the region in the winter of 2015, 
four homes in Puerto Aysén burned, three of them on the block where I lived.  Of thirty 
families surveyed, two thirds reported that they either knew or were related to someone 
who had lost their home to fire, and two reported that they had lost their own homes to 
fire.  Data provided to me by the superintendent of the local volunteer fire department 
tracked 180 household fires, at least 33 of which began because of creosote buildup in the 
chimney in 2014 alone.  According to the superintendent, more than 70% of fires that 
occur in Puerto Aysén are caused by wood burning stoves, either because residents fail to 
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clean their chimneys regularly, or because they do not dispose of the ashes generated by 
their woodstoves safely, causing unnoticed hot coals to ignite other materials. 
 This highlights another fact of life on the southern frontier: lack of firewood 
knowledge or the failure to deploy that knowledge can be deadly.  Though Aysén is not 
unique for the wood-frame construction of most houses (this is common farther north in 
cities like Temuco and Puerto Montt as well as in rural parts of the Región de los Lagos) 
this construction technique, the proximity of houses to one another in villages and towns, 
and the reliance on wood burning stoves does create a much higher risk of fire than is 
found elsewhere in the country. 
This risk is a major factor in disputes between neighbors.  Several survey 
respondents told me how concerned they were about their neighbors, either because they 
were irresponsible or, in one case, because she was allegedly an alcoholic and therefore 
couldn’t be trusted to take care of her stove safely.  In Puerto Aysén, where fires can and 
do occasionally burn whole city blocks, these concerns are hardly unfounded, even if 
they are presented with the kind of middle-class-sensibility many of us in the United 
States associate with busybodies who worry about how often their neighbors cut their 
lawns. 
But it isn’t simply that certain residents are irresponsible: as Gualterio told me, 
when the price of firewood skyrocketed in 2012, many firewood traders sought to make a 
quick profit by selling any wood that they could get their hands on, including wood that 
had been inadequately cured and was therefore still damp when it was burned.  This type 
of wet wood produces more creosote—as does burning soft coniferous wood32—which 
                                                 
32 Another reason that the replacement of native hardwood forests with pine plantations foreshadows an 
impending crisis. 
 49 
dramatically increases the risk of chimney fires.  Given that low-income families 
frequently bought lower quality of firewood because of its lower price, and that these 
families had less income to spend on regular chimney sweeping, there was a consistent 
perception among my middle-class interlocutors that while a single fire was a risk to 
every house on the block, poor families were more likely to cause such disasters. 
Trembling Hands 
July 8, 2015 
 
I am walking along the northern end of the ribera norte in Puerto Aysén, where a 
muddy lane runs parallel to a series of marshes, separating them from the shingled 
houses that mark the edge of town.  Most of the houses are one story, and many of their 
weather beaten wooden doors have rotted at the bottom from the accumulated spatter of 
years of rain.  I am conducting a survey: thirteen questions designed to collect 
demographic information about residents, their relationship to FOSIS and the newly 
introduced firewood subsidy, and their opinion on the state’s role in the region.  Beyond 
the “data” this survey will hopefully yield, it is a good way to start conversations—
conversations that will shed light on things I haven’t thought to ask or include in the 
survey. 
But knocking on strangers’ doors in a steady drizzle is a daunting task, and today, 
the fifth day that I have gone house to house on a particular block, I feel beaten down 
and frayed, not unlike the waterlogged and battered wooden doors where I’m knocking.  I 
have learned, however, to boost my success rate by looking at chimneys first—smoke is a 
telltale sign that someone is there to answer the door—and to have my university 
identification in hand.   Even a university ID in English establishes credibility and 
demonstrates that I am not selling anything. 
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I knock on the door of low-slung brown house with a sagging roof.  An old woman 
in thick glasses answers the door, and after looking me up and down, invites me into the 
house.  This is common, I have discovered.  If residents are willing to talk, they are also 
determined to be hospitable and to bring you inside.  I have been offered tea and coffee 
on multiple occasions and am always seated by the fire as I awkwardly launch into my 
questions. 
The old woman sits down on an upholstered bench by the cookstove—the only 
source of heat in the house—and rubs her hands together gingerly.  She is wearing an 
apron and a heavy black sweater.  She adjusts her glasses and looks at me expectantly.  
She tells me that she does receive the bono de calefacción from FOSIS, but bemoans that 
it isn’t enough.  As she holds her wrinkled hands over the cookstove, I can see them 
shake.  She tells me that she has recently been diagnosed with diabetes, and that she 
doesn’t think that they have her on the correct medicine.  I recognize her symptoms now.  
My grandfather had similar shakes when he took the wrong dose—or more often, when 
he failed to take the required dose—of insulin. 
She tells me that she worries every day about paying for her medical bills.  She is 
living on her late husband’s state pension.  He was a carabinero (police officer) here in 
Aysén, she tells me, like many of the men who settled here in the 1950s and 1960s.  One 
of her two daughters lives in Coyhaique, the regional capital an hour up the road.  The 
other is in “the north.”  Her description makes me think that this daughter is likely in 
Antofagasta, but she never mentions the city by name.  She laments that her daughters 
don’t see her anymore, but says she understands that they have to work. 
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Trying to turn the conversation back to firewood and FOSIS, I ask her if she 
thinks the state could spend more on the bono.  She becomes emotional, raising her voice, 
which shakes like her hands, “I used to be able to buy, but the cost went up and I also got 
sick and had to spend money on medicine.”  She holds up one hand, and I can see a long 
burn along the edge of her palm.  I am not sure, and do not ask, for the direct connection 
between her burn and her illness, but with the tremors in her hands and the need to fuel 
the cookstove, I suspect she accidentally placed her hand on the surface.  She is starting 
to cry.  I am extremely uncomfortable.  I feel like an intruder; like the information I am 
here to collect is only increasing her suffering.  The knowledge that I explained my 
project, presented my credentials, and attained informed consent before entering the 
house does nothing to assuage my guilty feeling.  I nod as she continues.  I no longer feel 
like I can direct the conversation towards my survey questions.  I can only listen. 
“Look,” she says, “before the firewood was much cheaper.  How Aysén is 
expensive!  Everything!”  I nod again.  We stare at each other in silence and she adjusts 
the teapot in front of her on the stove.  Feeling as uncomfortable with the silence as I am 
with my position as surveyor, I ask if she thinks the state can help in other ways.  She 
shakes her head.  “One has to think,” she begins, “With all the help that they give—and I 
am grateful, thanks to God—what is it doing to the people?  What is it doing to the 
republic?”   
I wait for her to continue, but she looks down.  The tears in her eyes seem to hang 
there, rather than rolling down her cheeks.  Awkwardly, I fumble with my papers.  I see 
no option but to ask my next question: whether she knows anyone in the neighborhood 
who has experienced an accidental fire. 
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“Oh yes.” She says.  “And with all the sacrifices people make here, to lose 
everything!”  She raises her trembling hands and adjusts her glasses.  “And I don’t know 
why it happens!” 
She pauses again, and then adds an afterthought, softly, as if speaking only to 
herself: “ Every day is worse here in Aysén.” 
The Costs 
Not all destruction wrought by woodstoves in Aysén is catastrophic.  Personal 
injuries on or around the stove are common, particularly among children and the elderly.   
Having multiple generations in the same small house is common in Aysén, and more than 
one survey respondent suggested to me that moving extended family into a shared house 
was a strategy they had employed since the introduction of the FOSIS subsidy.  Because 
most elderly people collecting a pension qualify for the subsidy, this is a means for adult 
children—who are typically responsible for the care of elderly parents anyway—to 
defray heating costs for themselves and their own children even if their income level is 
not low enough for them to receive the subsidy.  Since many more affluent families have 
abandoned this traditional inter-generational model of living in favor of a more “modern” 
lifestyle in which only the nuclear family lives under the same roof, the risk of burns is 
also higher among lower income residents.   
Still, the basic problem for most survey respondents is the same, regardless of 
their socioeconomic status: the state’s interference in the firewood market, beginning in 
2012, brought about massive price increases.   
For middle class residents’ whose middling salaries are enough exempt them from 
the subsidy, this simply means that their cost of living during the winter months more 
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than doubled.   For those who do qualify—particularly elderly people living on a fixed 
income—the subsidy is not enough to offset the price increase.   Multiple residents 
informed me that they need to burn firewood to heat their homes seven to nine months 
out of the year, depending on the weather.  The average household burns roughly 3 cubic 
meters of firewood per month,33 which at post-subsidy prices means that they incur a cost 
of between 90-99,000 pesos each month.  The current subsidy is 100,000 pesos.  This 
means that the subsidy pays for them to heat their home for one month.  Assuming that 
they are heating their homes with firewood for eight months out of the year but that the 
subsidy offsets the cost for one of these months, residents are now paying roughly 
693,000 pesos per year to heat their homes.  Before the introduction of the subsidy in 
2012 the same household would have paid roughly 312,000 pesos per year.  This 
represents an increase of 381,000 pesos per year, or roughly $573 USD. 
It is not hard to understand, when looking at the cold numbers, that this represents 
an untenable increase for many families.  They simply do not have the means to pay, but 
they also cannot move.  Most of the families that qualify for the subsidy qualify because 
the head of the household either does not work or works for depressed wages as a manual 
laborer in one of the region’s main industries—aquaculture, fish processing, or timber.  
When talking to an elderly woman, however, who lives on her deceased husband’s 
pension and who must decide between paying for her medication or paying to heat her 
house, the situation reveals itself in starkly human terms.  Here, gender, age, and 
socioeconomic status combine to render certain bodies particularly vulnerable to the 
                                                 
33 This is a very rough approximation based on data collected from friends and from my survey of 30 
households, but is dependent on whether the household uses propane or firewood for their cocina 
(cookstove) and whether the cookstove is the primary heat source as well, or whether there is an additional 
estufa (woodstove) whose sole purpose is heating the house.  This, in turn, is connected to the 
socioeconomic status of the household. 
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market fluctuations that have accompanied state interventions on the southern frontier.  
Because of her reliance on a state pension, the woman I spoke to on July 8 qualifies for 
the subsidy, but she has no means of increasing her monthly allotment, which is 
calibrated based on her late husband’s years of service and final pay grade and not 
connected to fluid costs of living.   Furthermore, the conditions in Aysén34 encourage 
adult children to move away in order to pursue higher education or white-collar work.  
Whereas in the past, extended kin networks might have provided support, today elderly 
Ayséninos may have no one living close enough to respond in times of need—or medical 
emergency. 
None of this is to say that the state is unfeeling, or oblivious to the situation.  
Numerous survey respondents told me that they believed the Chilean state had the best 
intentions when it created the regional subsidy.  And the FOSIS employees administering 
the subsidy live in the region—so they rely on firewood as much as the citizens they are 
attempting to serve.  But the fact remains that this particular state technology, targeting 
the wellbeing of the population living on the southern frontier has had devastating 
consequences that are only fully revealed through conversations around the hearth. 
Conclusions: Unsettling the frontier 
 Though the Chilean far south has been subject to efforts to incorporate it into the 
larger national territory since the 1870s, and was established as part of the Chilean state 
in 1928, it was not until the 1970s that the state became “vertically encompassing” 
(Ferguson and Gupta 2002).  The authoritarian nature of the Pinochet government, along 
with the technologies available to the regime meant that by the time Chile returned to 
democracy under the leadership of Patricio Aylwin in 1990, the state’s presence on the 
                                                 
34 Perhaps first and foremost the absence of a university in the region. 
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frontier was firmly established.  If frontier processes “wax and wane according to the 
strength of the state and the pressure of global markets” (Eilenberg 2014:162), then the 
raw power of the dictatorship combined with the demand for Chile’s natural resources in 
the global marketplace should have meant the stabilization and “resolution” of the 
frontier.  After all, Pinochet’s was a government which routinely established “states of 
emergency” to justify its policies and which disappeared, tortured and imprisoned tens of 
thousands of its own citizens through a bureaucracy of terror. 
Indeed, the arrival of government bureaucrats and other designated “experts” did 
render frontier problems technical (Li 2007), making them into deficiencies to be 
rectified though specific interventions and programs targeting certain sectors of the 
population.  The frontier remained a depoliticized space subject to decisions made in 
Santiago, where the top priority was and continues to be growing the national economy 
through free trade and the export of raw materials. 
And yet, new technologies introduced to settle frontier problems and reduce 
economic deficiencies may have ultimately set the stage for the recent unsettling of the 
frontier.  Tax breaks for forestry firms and the consolidation of territory into large-scale 
plantations ensured that native tree species were displaced by pine grown for export.  The 
establishment of the zona franca in Puerto Chacabuco flooded local marketplaces with 
cheap manufactured goods from across the Pacific, furthering the collapse of local 
production and helping to drive locals into unskilled labor in the forestry and aquaculture 
sectors.  The zona system heightened tensions between locals and newcomers with 
“advanced knowledge” deemed valuable by state agencies and corporations.  Laws 
established to protect private property and encourage foreign investment brought foreign 
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energy companies and environmentalists to the region, setting up clashes over dams and 
raising questions about the future of Patagonia’s natural landscape.   
If, as Aihwa Ong has written, “the exercise of power depends on a variety of 
technologies that target populations as well as territory in order to solve problems of 
wealth, growth, and security” (Ong 2006:100), then the failure of these technologies in 
the eyes of citizens certainly poses a challenge to power, however authoritarian in nature.  
This is what happened in 2011, when powerful transnational forces and local resentments 
combined to destabilize and effectively unsettle the frontier. 
The state’s first effort to “put the genie back in the bottle” and remake the frontier 
into a depoliticized space took the form of the FOSIS firewood subsidy for vulnerable 
families.  This subsidy was certainly “invented in an ad hoc way” from practices and 
procedures—and one might add material in the form of native hardwood—“that 
happened to be available” (Rose 1999:2) but it did nothing to depoliticize the region.  
Instead, it mired the state—particularly FOSIS but also the carabineros charged with 
protecting state agents and armored trucks full of cash—in a political arena for which it 
was woefully underqualified. 
Firewood, however, has always been political for Ayséninos, and it is perhaps the 
last remaining sector of the economy where their local knowledge enables them to 
engage in practices wholly beyond the reach of the state.  From Gualterio, who forages 
for deadwood on his friends’ property (and likely in nearby national parks and reserves as 
well) to Gilberto, who helped establish Coleña Aysén as a cooperative that could take 
advantage of the sudden flood of government cash and provide benefits to its members, 
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local responses to the subsidy used local knowledge to avoid the “disastrous failure” of 
the latest government technology (Chatterjee 2004:37).    
Local knowledge and the firewood practices it engenders are not limited to its 
procurement and sale.  Ayséninos consider the safe use of woodstoves to be part of civic 
responsibility, and for outsiders who have come to the region to work in its export 
industries, demonstrating firewood knowledge represents an important strategy for 
gaining acceptance.  More than once while I was in the field, interlocutors boasted to 
friends and coworkers that I knew how to split logs and start a fire without a struggle,35 
for this gave me—and by extension, them—social capital. 
Finally, the centrality of the hearth in Aysén has meant that even as the state has 
sought to “modernize” life there, families still engage in traditional practices that have 
been abandoned elsewhere, like multi-generational households. The subsidy actually 
encouraged these practices in many cases, since the elderly nearly always qualify and 
working class parents often earn just enough not to.  Local knowledge and local practices 
ensure that no matter how powerful the state, citizens living on the frontier maintain a 
measure of autonomy.   Self-sufficiency is a source of pride and regional identity among 
Ayséninos, as well as among outsiders who have come to stay in the extreme south.   
This does not undermine state power in Aysén.  As the numerous agencies that 
line the streets around the Plaza de Armas in Coyhaique attest, the Chilean state has been 
powerfully present on the southern frontier for nearly forty years, and present for nearly a 
century before that.   But state power in Aysén is indeed “an outcome of the composition 
and assembling of actors, flows, buildings and relations of authority into relatively 
durable associations” (Rose 2006:148), and recent events have shown that the 
                                                 
35 Benefits of having grown up in rural Maine, where the winters are almost as long as they are in Aysén. 
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associations promoted during the dictatorship years and throughout the 1990s are far less 
durable than the government in Santiago once thought.  The frontier, it seems, is far from 
settled. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 59 
References 
Barney, Keith.  
2009. Laos and the Making of a ‘Relational’ Resource Frontier. Geographical 
Journal. 175(2): 146–159. 
Carruthers, David. 
2001. Environmental Politics in Chile: Legacies of Dictatorship and Democracy.  
Third World Quarterly. 22(3):343-358. 
Castree, Noel. 
2008. Neoliberalizing Nature: The Logics of Deregulation and Reregulation. 
Environment and Planning. 40: 131-152 
Chatterjee, Partha. 
2004. The Politics of the Governed: Reflections on Popular Politics in Most of the 
World. New York: Columbia University Press. 
Eilenberg, Michael. 
2014. Frontier Constellations: Agrarian Expansion and Sovereignty on the 
Indonesian-Malaysian Border. Journal of Peasant Studies. 41(2):157-182 
Escobar, Arturo.  
2012 (1995). Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third 
World. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Ferguson, James and Akhil Gupta. 
2002. Spatializing States: Toward an Ethnography of Neoliberal Governmentality. 
American Ethnologist 29(4):981-1002 
1992. Space, Identity, and the Politics of Difference. Cultural Anthropology 
7(1):6-23. 
Foucault, Michel. 
2006. Governmentality. In Anthropology of the State: A Reader. Aradhana 
Sharma and Akhil Gupta eds. Pp. 131-143. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing. 
Garcia Marquez, Gabriel. 
2013 (1974). “Why Allende Had to Die” The New Statesman. March 29-April 11. 
Pp. 44-49. 
Geiger, Danilo ed. 
2008. Frontier Encounters: Indigenous Communities and Settlers in Asia and 
Latin America. Copenhagen: International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs. 
Gobierno Regiónal de Aysén 
 2009. Estrategia Regional de Desarrollo de Aysén. Coyhaique, Chile. 
 60 
Gudynas, Eduardo. 
 2011. Buen Vivir: Today’s Tomorrow. Development. 54(4): 441-447 
Han, Clara. 
2012. Life in Debt: Times of Care and Violence in Neoliberal Chile.  Berkeley: 
University of California Press. 
Harvey, David. 
2005. A Brief History of Neoliberalism. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Henne, Adam and Teena Gabrielson. 
2012. Chile is Timber Country: Citizenship, Justice, and Scale in the Chilean 
Native Forest Market Campaign. In Environment and Citizenship in Latin 
America: Natures Subjects and Struggles. Alex Latta and Hannah Wittman, eds. 
Pp. 149-166. New York: Berghahn Books 
Hershatter, Gail. 
2011. The Gender of Memory: Rural Women and China’s Collective Past. 
Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Klubock, Thomas Miller. 
2011. The Nature of the Frontier: Forests and Peasant Uprisings in Southern 
Chile. Social History. 36(2): 121-142  
2004. Land, Labor, and Environmental Change in the Forstry Sector in Chile, 
1973-1998. In Victims of the Chilean Miracle: Workers and Neoliberalism in the 
Pinochet Era, 1973-2002. Peter Winn, ed. Pp. 337-388. Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press. 
Latta, Alex and Hannah Wittman. 
2012.Citizens, Society and Nature: Sites of Inquiry, Points of Departure. In 
Environment and Citizenship in Latin America: Natures, Subjects, and Struggles. 
Alex Latta and Hannah Wittman, eds. Pp. 1-20. New York: Berghahn Books. 
Li, Tania. 
2007. The Will to Improve: Governmentality, Development, and the Practice of 
Politics. Durham: Duke University Press. 
Mayo, John. 
1990. Rich in Hope: The Chilean Grain Trade and the Australian Gold Rushes. 
The Great Circle. 12(1): 42-58. 
Norton, Susan Lee. 
2001. Roaring Camp: The Social World of the California Gold Rush. New York: 
W. W. Norton and Company. 
 
 
 61 
Ong, Aihwa. 
2006. Neoliberalism as Exception: Mutations in Citizenship and Sovereignty. 
Durham, NC: Duke University Press. 
Rose, Nikolas. 
2006. Governing “Advanced” Liberal Democracies. In Anthropology of the State: 
A Reader. Aradhana Sharma and Akhil Gupta eds. Pp. 131-143. Malden, MA: 
Blackwell Publishing. 
1999. Powers of Freedom: Reframing Political Thought. New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Sack, Robert David.  
1986. Human Territoriality : Its Theory and History. New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Schurman, Rachel. 
2004. Shuckers, Sorters, Headers, and Gutters: Labor in the Fisheries Sector. In 
Victims of the Chilean Miracle: Workers and Neoliberalism in the Pinochet Era, 
1973-2002. Peter Winn, ed. Pp. 298-336. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. 
Simpson Baeza, Enrique M. 
2011(1874). Viajes de Exploración por los Archipiélagos Australes. Temuco, 
Chile: Ofqui Editores. 
Singh, J. T. Nem 
2010 Reconstituting the Neostructuralist State: The Political Economy of 
Continuity and Change in Chilean Mining Policy. Third World Quarterly 
31(8):1413-1433 
Stern, Steve.  
2010. Reckoning with Pinochet: The Memory Question in Democratic Chile, 
1989-2006.  Durham, NC: Duke University Press. 
2006. Battling for Hearts and Minds: Memory Struggles in Pinochet’s Chile, 
1973-1988. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. 
Tsing, Anna. 
2009. Supply-Chains and the Human Condition. Rethinking Marxism. 21(2):148-
176 
2005. Friction: An Ethnography of Global Connection. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press. 
2003. Natural resource and capitalist frontiers. Economic & Political Weekly. 
38(48): 5100–5106. 
 
 
 62 
Valdez, Juan Gabriel 
1995. Pinochet’s Economists: The Chicago School in Chile. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Vandergeest, Peter and Nancy Peluso. 
1995. Territorialization and State Power in Thailand. Theory and Society. 24:385-
426. 
Winn, Peter. 
2004. The Pinochet Era. In Victims of the Chilean Miracle: Workers and 
Neoliberalism in the Pinochet Era, 1973-2002. Peter Winn, ed. Pp. 14-70. 
Durham, NC: Duke University Press. 
Zibechi, Raúl  
2012. Latin America: A New Cycle of Social Struggles. NACLA Report on the 
Americas. 45(2):37-49 
 
 
